
Oh, no! The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on a bankruptcy-confronts-arbitration question in Goldman Sachs Bank USA v. Brown, Case No. 25-1408!
The precise question presented in Goldman Sach v. Brown is:
- “Whether, and under what circumstances, a bankruptcy court may override the [Federal Arbitration Act] and refuse to honor a valid arbitration agreement with respect to [11 U.S.C.] Section 362(k) claims.”
The Fourth Circuit below held that a § 362(k) damages claim for violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is not arbitrable.
The Hope & Concerns
Here’s hoping, for the good of the entire bankruptcy system and all its constituencies, that the Supreme Court rules like this:
- bankruptcy courts must be allowed to handle essential bankruptcy functions under the Bankruptcy Code; and
- pre-petition arbitration agreements must not be allowed to interfere.
What follows is a list of four specific concerns suggesting that the Court might go in a different direction than this hope, followed by an explanation under each concern of grounds for hope despite that concern.
First Concern: History of Enforcing Arbitration Agreements
The U.S. Supreme Court has a long history of upholding arbitration agreements, and many courts interpret such actions as imposing a “policy favoring arbitration.”
–Basis for Hope
In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court rejects the idea of a “policy favoring arbitration.” In Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411 (2022), the Court explains:
- “Nine circuits, including the Eighth, have invoked ‘the strong federal policy favoring arbitration’ . . . . Two circuits have rejected that rule. We do too.” (596 U.S. at 416); and
- “The [correct statement of] policy is to make ‘arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so’” (id., at 418).
Additionally, the circuit split, cited in the Goldman Sachs v. Brown Petition for Certiorari, is between the Fourth Circuit’s Goldman Sachs v. Brown opinion and the Second Circuit’s MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006) opinion.
Such MBNA v. Hill opinion is founded on the Supreme Court’s rejected propositions that the Federal Arbitration Act establishes:
- “a federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” (436 F.3d at 107); and
- a “presumption in favor of arbitration” (id., at 108).
Presumably, such a faulty foundation will put the MBNA v. Hill position at a disadvantage from the get-go.
Second Concern: History of Ignoring Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause and Uniformity Requirement
The U.S. Supreme Court tends to ignore the U.S. Constitution’s bankruptcy clause, when writing its Bankruptcy Code opinions. One commentator puts the tendency this way:
- the U.S. Supreme Court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction cases, since enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, “fail to address . . . in any substantial way” the relationship between the Constitution’s “Bankruptcies” clause in Art. I and the Article III judicial power;
- the Constitution’s “Bankruptcies” clause “was not mentioned, even in passing,” in Granfinanciera (except for Justice White’s dissent), “appears only as an aside” and only “in the dissent” in Stern v. Marshall, and appears only “in a brief passage near the end” of a “dissent” in Wellness;
- all of this consigns the Constitution’s “Bankruptcies” clause “to a static historical view” that “gives Congress no authority” to “broaden the bankruptcy system to accommodate modern commerce”; and
- such omissions and limited discussions “may seem like a small point,” but they are “obvious.”[Fn. 1].
–Bases for Hope
Siegel v. Fitzgerald. In 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court focused on the Constitution’s uniformity requirement for bankruptcy laws in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 596 U.S. 464 (2022), which rejects disparate fee amounts for different bankruptcy districts.
The Court’s Siegel v. Fitzgerald analysis includes:
- the Constitution’s “uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies” language, though incapable of final definition, includes nothing less than the subject of the relations between a debtor and debtor’s creditors (596 U.S. at 473);
- the Bankruptcy Clause grants plenary power to Congress over the whole subject of “bankruptcies” and does not “limit” the scope of Congressional authority (id., at 474);
- the general powers of the Necessary and Proper Clause must be added to the Bankruptcy Clause’s “specific grant” of power to Congress to legislate on the subject of bankruptcies (id.); and
- Congress cannot evade the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause by enacting legislation under other grants of authority in the Constitution (id.).
This analysis seems to bode well for the Goldman Sachs v. Brown case.
Circuit Split. Further, the circuit split for Goldman Sachs v. Brown provides hope. Here’s how:
- the Second Circuit MBNA v. Hill opinion (as noted above, provides the split with the Fourth Circuit’s Goldman Sachs v. Brown) does not mention the U.S. Constitution’s bankruptcy clause (not even once), nor does it mention the constitutional word “uniform” (again, not even once); whereas,
- in Goldman Sachs Bank USA v. Brown, 170 F.4th 249 (4th Cir. 2026), the Fourth Circuit focuses on the U.S. Constitution’s bankruptcy uniformity requirement as creating a special status for the Bankruptcy Code as against the Federal Arbitration Act—for example:
- “Arbitration individualizes the disposition of claims” (170 F.4th at 259); and
- “there is no ability to assure their uniformity through appeal to the courts and ultimately the Supreme Court” because “judicial review of an arbitration award is severely circumscribed, and is among the narrowest known at law” (id., emphasis added).
Justice Catron in Nelson v. Carland. The Fourth Circuit’s “narrowest known” standard of review emphasized above reiterates an argument first made by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice 183 years ago: by Justice John Catron in Nelson v. Carland, 42 U.S. 265 (1843).
In Nelson v. Carland, Justice Catron explains how a lack-of-adequate-judicial-review (under the Bankruptcy Act of 1841) violates the Constitution’s uniformity requirement:
- The 1841 act is administered by more than thirty judges, acting separately;
- A debtor may not appeal to the circuit court (save in the single case of a refusal to finally discharge the bankrupt from his debts), and no debtor appeal is allowed to the Supreme Court;
- A creditor may not appeal anything in any bankruptcy case, either from the district court to the circuit court or to the Supreme Court;
- It follows that the Supreme Court has no power to make uniform the conflicting constructions of the bankruptcy law;
- “No law that Congress ever passed has in it to a greater degree the elements of various construction and confusion than the bankrupt law of 1841”—
- “thirty judges act separately, and all are exempt from the revising power of the Supreme Court, which exists to produce uniformity of decision and construction”; and
- “Instead of providing a uniform system of bankruptcy, the 1841 bankruptcy act has become, by the conflicting constructions put upon it, little more uniform than the conflicting state insolvent laws.”
Similarly, the standard for appellate review of an arbitration award, under the Federal Arbitration Act, is little more than a rubber stamp. Consequently, using Justice Catron’s logic of 183 years ago:
- arbitration panel awards are largely exempt from the revising power of the Supreme Court; and
- conflicting constructions that arbitration panels can put upon bankruptcy laws, without meaningful and substantive judicial review, cannot satisfy the Constitution’s uniformity requirement.
Third Concern: Screwing Up Our Bankruptcy World
On every major bankruptcy case it decides, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to screw up our bankruptcy world. Examples include:
- Northern Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (one vote short of declaring the entire Bankruptcy Code unconstitutional);
- Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordgerg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (dissent: Congress needs to be permitted “at long last to fashion a modern bankruptcy system which places the basic rudiments of the bankruptcy process in the hands of an expert equitable tribunal”);
- Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011) (introduces the ill-fated “public rights doctrine” into bankruptcy jurisprudence to limit bankruptcy court authority);
- Fulton v. City of Chicago, 592 U.S. 154 (2021) (refusing to turn over a debtor’s impounded vehicle does not “exercise control over property of the estate”); and
- Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69 (2023) (an honest debtor can be denied a discharge for someone else’s—an agent’s—dishonesty).
–Basis for Hope
In the mid-2010s, the U.S. Supreme Court issues these two opinions favorable to the entire bankruptcy system, on procedural/technical questions:
- Executive Benefits v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25 (2014) (a bankruptcy court can decide Stern v. Marshall claims, on which it has no jurisdiction, when a de novo review is provided on appeal by a U.S. district court); and
- Wellness International Network, Ltd. V. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015) (bankruptcy courts can decide, by consent of the parties, an issue placed beyond bankruptcy court jurisdiction by Stern v. Marshall).
The bankruptcy v. arbitration question in Goldman Sachs v. Brown appears to raise a similar type of procedural/technical issue.
Fourth Concern: Potential Solicitor General Input
If the U.S. Supreme Court requests input from the Solicitor General, in Goldman Sachs v. Brown (as it often does in bankruptcy cases), will the the Solicitor take a pro-arbitration position or a pro-bankruptcy position?
The concern is that, (i) the U.S. Supreme Court often adopts the Solicitor’s position on bankruptcy questions, and (ii) the Solicitor (as legal counsel for the largest creditor in the land—the U.S. Government) always takes a pro-creditor position.
–Basis for Hope
Hopefully, the Solicitor General would, if asked to opine in Goldman Sachs v. Brown, take a pro-bankruptcy view. This hope is based on:
- the Solicitor speaks for the U.S. Trustee’s office, whose mission is to promote the integrity and efficiency of the bankruptcy system for the benefit of all stakeholders—hopefully, such mission translates into protecting the essential Bankruptcy Code functions from impediments like arbitration; and
- the Solicitor should not have a bias toward arbitration because government contracts (including loan agreements) typically do not contain arbitration provisions—at least, that’s my understanding;
Conclusion
A bankruptcy question at the U.S. Supreme Court is often a crap shoot that screw up our bankruptcy world.
But, hopefully, there are sufficient grounds, under each of the concerns identified above, to turn the tide in favor of protecting basic functions of the Bankruptcy Code from arbitration impediments.
———————
Footnote 1: Such information and quotes are from, Ronald J. Mann: Bankruptcy and the U.S. Supreme Court, at 5.7 (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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