Can “Void” Judgment Become Valid By Passage Of Time? (Certiorari Granted on 6/6/2025)

By: Donald L Swanson

Can a judgment that’s “void” for lack of jurisdiction become valid by the passage of time?

That’s the question on which the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari (on June 6, 2025—in Case No. 24-808, Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, Chapter 7 Trustee for Vist-Pro Automotive, LLC.).

The formally-stated question before the Supreme Court, in the Coney Island Petition, is this:

• “Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.”

Said Rule 60 is titled “Relief from a Judgment or Order,” its subpart (c) is titled “Timing and Effect of the Motion,” and its pertinent language for the Coney Island case is (emphasis added):

• “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.”

The Circuit opinion below is Burton V. Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. (In re Vist-Pro Auto., LLC), 109 F.4th 438 (6th Cir. 2024).  What follows is a summary of the Circuit opinion.

Facts

In November 2014, an involuntary bankruptcy is filed against Debtor in the Middle Tennessee District (Case No. 3:14-bk-09118), and the case converts to Chapter 11 by agreement of the parties.

In February 2015, Debtor files a Complaint in the Bankruptcy Court against Defendant to recover $50,000 of unpaid invoices (Adv. Pro. No. 3:15-ap-90079).   

Defendant never responds to the Complaint, so a default judgment is entered.  Years later, Defendant moves to vacate the default judgment as void—because Defendant was never properly served.

Here’s what happened.

–Summons

In the adversary, Debtor mails the summons to Defendant’s place of business in Brooklyn, NY.  The envelope is addressed to Defendant’s corporate name, without identifying any corporate officer or other individual.

On New York Department of State records, the corporation itself, rather than an individual, is identified as Defendant’s registered agent for service of process.

–Default Judgment

Since Defendant does not respond to the Complaint:

• Debtor promptly moves for a default judgment, mailing notice of such motion to Defendant’s Brooklyn, NY, address—again, without identifying any individual on the envelope; and
• in May 2015, the Bankruptcy Court enters a default judgment against Defendant.

–Collection Efforts

Then, Debtor’s bankruptcy case is converted to Chapter 7, a Chapter 7 Trustee is appointed, and Trustee attempts to collect on the default judgment:

• in April 2016, Trustee sends a letter to Defendant demanding payment of the default judgment (addressed to Defendant’s CEO, who admits receiving the letter); and
• in February 2021, Trustee levies on Defendant’s bank account—which contains $97,000 of Defendant’s money.

–Moving to Vacate

Defendant responds with two failed motions to vacate the default judgment: (i) one in October 2021, and (ii) again in July 2022—this July attempt is what now sits before the U.S. Supreme Court.

In the July 2022 attempt, Defendant argues that the default judgment is “void” under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4)[fn. 1] because:

• Debtor failed to properly serve Defendant in the adversary proceeding; and
• so, the Bankruptcy Court never acquired personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7004(b)(3) allows service on a corporation:

• “by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the attention of an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.”

Defendant argues that, since Debtor addressed its summons and complaint to Defendant’s corporate name (without identifying any individual):

• such service attempt was ineffective and “void” under Rule 60(b)(4); and
• no time limit exists for filing a motion to vacate a void judgment.

–Bankruptcy Court Ruling & Appeals

The Bankruptcy Court disagrees and denies Defendant’s motion, because:

• under Sixth Circuit precedent, “courts retain discretion” to deny such a motion when the motion is not made within a “reasonable time”;
• Defendant admits having actual notice of the default judgment no later than April 2016; and
• Defendant’s years-long delay in moving to vacate the judgment is unreasonable.

The District Court affirms on appeal, and Defendant appeals to the Sixth Circuit.  

Sixth Circuit Ruling

Defendant argues against a time limit, because a “void” judgment is premised on either:

• a jurisdictional error; or
• a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.

The Sixth Circuit rejects such argument because of the Rule 60(c)(1) text, which:

• says that Rule 60(b) motions “must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding”; and
• speaks in plain terms and requires that “All” Rule 60(b) motions “must be filed ‘within a reasonable time'”—and for some, a “reasonable time” may not exceed one year; and
• since Defendant brought its motion under Rule 60(b)(4), the text says that such motion must be filed within a “reasonable time,” though not necessarily within one year.

Sixth Circuit precedents include a citizenship ruling in United States v. Dailide, 316 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2003):

• Dailide had moved to vacate a citizenship-revocation order entered without subject-matter jurisdiction as “void” under Rule 60(b)(4); but
• the Sixth Circuit ruled that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion “is only cognizable if brought within a reasonable time” and Dailide’s four-years delay in bringing the motion was not reasonable; and
• the distinction between a judgment “void” for lack of personal jurisdiction in Coney Island and “void” for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in Dailide is insignificant—a court lacking either type of jurisdiction is “powerless to proceed to an adjudication” just the same.   

Circuit Split

The Sixth Circuit’s Coney Island ruling is on the short end of a circuit split:

• “We acknowledge that our circuit appears to be out of step with the majority view, which holds that Rule 60(b)(4) motions may be brought at any time”; and
• “We must follow our own circuit precedent regardless.”

The Sixth Circuit defends its position with this double negative: “Our precedent is also not without virtue” for three reasons.

First, “ours is the only reading that is faithful to the text of Rule 60(c)(1), which by its plain terms imposes a reasonable-time requirement on each of the enumerated grounds in Rule 60(b)”:

• “If the drafters of the rule meant that a district court may never dismiss a Rule 60(b)(4) motion as untimely, then commanding that such motions ‘must be made within a reasonable time’ was an odd way to express it”; and
• “in 1946, when Rule 60 was amended to its present substantive form, there was a well-established rule that void judgments could be vacated at any time,” but Rule 60 contains no such provision.

Second, “applying a reasonable-time limitation to Rule 60(b)(4) motions comports with basic equitable principles”:

• Defendant’s no-time-limit position would permit a party to “consciously sleep on its rights” for wrongful ends;
• the fact that a void judgment is premised on a fundamental “jurisdictional error” or on “a violation of due process”—does not “tell us what to do about a void judgment”; but
• the text of Rule 60 and Sixth Circuit precedents evince a belief that, “in some circumstances, a court may reasonably decide that a motion to vacate has come too late.”

Third, “nothing about our interpretation of Rule 60 requires unfairness to a party who is subject to a void judgment”:

• the Rule “anticipates a fact-specific inquiry that can account for a variety of circumstances,” including innocent delays in learning about the judgment or its defects;
• what constitutes a “reasonable time” under Rule 60 “ordinarily depends on the facts of a given case including the length and circumstances of the delay, the prejudice to the opposing party by reason of the delay, and the circumstances compelling equitable relief”; and
• the “reasonable time” clock “begins ticking” when:
  • the movant is or should be aware of the factual basis for the motion; or
  • when enforcement of the judgment is first attempted.

Conclusion

It will be interesting to see how the U.S. Supreme Court resolves this case.

—————–

Footnote 1.  Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4) says, “On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void,” and such Rule is made applicable to adversary proceedings by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9024.

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