“I think it is unwise for the Court to decide” this issue because: (i) “Experience shows that we would greatly benefit from the view of additional courts of appeals on this question,” and (ii) “We also would have benefited from full, adversarial briefing.”
–Justice Clarence Thomas, dissenting in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic)., Case No. 15-649 in United States Supreme Court (March 22, 2017).
On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court issues its ruling in the In re Jevic case that, once again, screws up our bankruptcy world.
The U.S. Supreme Court has a history of rulings that screw up everyday life for bankruptcy practitioners and judges. One example is Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). Who would’ve ever guessed that a minor pop-culture celebrity (Vicki Lynn Marshall, aka Anna Nicole Smith) could wreak such havoc in our bankruptcy world. In a case with a long history of bizarre facts and procedural wrangling, the Supreme Court in Stern v. Marshall puts extreme limitations on the jurisdiction and role of the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts. The Supreme Court, in Stern v. Marshall, made a narrow and inflexible ruling about bankruptcy court jurisdiction. And it did so on constitutional grounds, which means that Congress is incapable of changing (or minimizing the impact of) the decision. We’ve all been struggling with the result ever since.
Here is the essence of the majority decision in the new In re Jevic case, penned by Justice Stephen Breyer:
“We turn to the basic question presented: Can a bankruptcy court approve a structured dismissal that provides for distributions that do not follow ordinary priority rules without the affected creditors’ consent? Our simple answer to this complicated question is ‘no.’”
Yikes! Therein lies the problem for bankruptcy practitioners and judges: the Supreme Court is providing a “simple answer” to a “complicated question.”
Here is some griping:
–None of the Supreme Court Justices has any significant experience in practicing under the Bankruptcy Code, which is a specialized area of the law. Perhaps that’s why they fall back on a simple answer to a complicated bankruptcy question. And, perhaps, that’s why they keep screwing things up for us.
–And the Supreme Court had to ignore some technical rules for getting to this In re Jevic decision: hence, Justice Thomas’s statement that rues the absence of “full, adversarial briefing.” Here’s my translation of his absence-of-full-briefing statement: “The Supreme Court doesn’t have adequate information or an adequate understanding to make this decision.”
So, what are we supposed to do with the Supreme Court’s simple – and simplistic – answer? Keep in mind that structured dismissals commonly arise in large and complex reorganization cases. There is nothing simplistic about such cases. A simple answer is not merely unhelpful . . . it’s harmful. Perhaps the Supreme Court Justices, in the bankruptcy context, could follow the words of the medical profession: “First do no harm.”
Justice Thomas is precisely correct in his comment that the Supreme Court would “greatly benefit” from an opportunity for additional courts of appeals to weigh-in on the question. Structured dismissals are a relatively new development in the bankruptcy world and apply only in exceptional circumstances. There are lots of smart judges out there in the Federal system: bankruptcy judges, district court judges, bankruptcy appellate panel judges, and court of appeals judges. One of the benefits of those many and multi-layer judges is that many smart judges can evaluate and address and explain and rule upon issues and facts relating to an important legal question before the question ever gets to the U.S. Supreme Court. Then, the Supreme Court Justices can draw on the words and wisdom of those other smart judges in reaching a decision. For the Supreme Court to jump-in at this early stage, without the benefit of a fully-developed multi-layer analysis of this In re Jevic question, is unfortunate in the extreme.
As a result, this new In re Jevic opinion creates major questions about basic bankruptcy practice that are hugely important to the administration of bankruptcy cases. For example:
What about first day orders and early/interim distributions mentioned in the majority opinion (which also violate the Code’s distribution priorities)?
–Are they actually okay or merely cited as a point of reference?
–Did the Court actually intend to bless critical vendor orders?
And what about an under-secured creditor gifting a portion of its collateral to the unsecured class as part of a structured dismissal–is that now prohibited . . . seriously?!
And how is the essence of this “simple answer” going to spill over into other complex contexts?
Ok. I’m done. Sorry about this rant!